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Abstract - Infants and young children with Down syndrome can be engaging and affectionate. 
It seems that in the early months of life their personal relations may be relatively ‘spared’ the 
effects of limitations in their capacities for information-processing. Yet how far is this the case as 
development proceeds? In this paper we discuss some ways in which social and cognitive devel-
opment interact and mutually influence one another over the first year or so of life, and present 
preliminary findings from a longitudinal study of infants with and without Down syndrome. The 
evidence suggests that the development of ‘triadic’ (person-person-world) social interactions may 
be affected by limited information-processing capacities in infants with Down syndrome, through a 
complex socially-mediated developmental trajectory.
Keywords: Down syndrome, infant attention, information processing, mother-infant interaction, 
joint attention, transactional processes
Introduction
Delay in the development of cognitive capacities is a pri-
mary consequence of Down syndrome. Despite such cogni-
tive delay, however, young children with Down syndrome 
can be empathic, affectionate and engaging (Wishart & 
Pitcairn, 2000). This might be taken to suggest that there 
are pre-specifi ed, independent, ‘domain specifi c’ pathways 
for some aspects of social and cognitive development. Yet 
if one adopts a perspective that overemphasises modularisa-
tion of function there is a danger that one may underes-
timate the complex transactional processes that occur 
between domains in social and cognitive development (see 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). We need to consider not only 
the possibility of relatively independent ‘domain specifi c’ 
developmental trajectories for some social and cognitive 
capacities, but also to work out the extent to which cogni-
tive and social development capacities, even those that may 
appear initially to develop relatively independently of each 
other, come to interact with and mutually infl uence one 
another, and lead to unique developmental outcomes. To 
this end we have conducted a detailed longitudinal study 
of a cohort of infants with and without Down syndrome 
and their mothers, following their progress from an early 
age. We have assessed children with Down syndrome at six 
monthly intervals from 6 through to 18 months, and con-
trasted their development with a control group of typically 
developing infants seen at 4, 7 and 10 months. 
Our aim was to study how social and cognitive capacities 
combine to create characteristic forms of infant-parent 
interaction in families of children with Down syndrome, 
and consider how these forms of interaction, in turn, 
regulate and infl uence other aspects of their social and 
cognitive development. This approach may help to explain 
the emergence of subtle differences as well as similarities 
in the social and cognitive capacities of people with Down 
syndrome when compared to typically developing chil-
dren (Chapman & Hesketh, 2000). This paper gives an 
overview of some fi ndings emerging from this study and 
outlines some of the methodological and conceptual issues 
that we have begun to address. 
Difficulties in measuring cognitive 
capacities
For many years the dominant view was that ‘cognition’ 
could be construed largely in terms of children’s progressive 
construction of knowledge based on their own active inter-
action with the world (Piaget, 1954). This view was chal-
lenged by psychologists adopting a so-called Vygotskian 
perspective (e.g. Bruner, 1975; Wertsch, 1985; Rogoff, 
1990). These theoreticians emphasised the role that social 
interaction and context plays in the co-construction of 
a child’s knowledge. Two issues relevant to our research 
emerge from these theoretical views. Firstly, these perspec-
tives remind us that the functions and structure of the 
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brain are not entirely predetermined, they are also depend-
ent on experience and active interaction with the world. 
Secondly, this reminds us that experiences are not purely 
a consequence of the activities of the individual. An indi-
vidual’s neuro-cognitive development is also determined by 
the instruction and scaffolding of others. At the very least 
others help to regulate the focus of the individual’s atten-
tion and assign signifi cance to information in the external 
world through social referencing and other ‘person-person-
world’ interaction (see Hobson, 2002). Hence, particularly 
early in life, to adequately characterise neuro-cognitive 
development we must consider the social context in which 
the infant is immersed. Secondly, this approach has high-
lighted limitations in tests of cognitive functioning and the 
importance, when testing children’s individual cognitive 
capacities, of considering the infl uence of the social context 
in which a test occurs (Light, 1986). This does not mean 
that a relatively ‘pure’ cognitive test cannot be devised, but 
it must be devised taking into account the infl uence on per-
formance of the social context. 
Thus, to assess interactions and transactions between cog-
nitive and social domains we need to have measures of an 
individual’s level of cognitive functioning that have allowed 
for social infl uences. We also need to defi ne clearly what 
‘cognitive’ functions are. Early cognitive ability has been 
characterised as the development of abilities to form and 
utilise representations of the world and to develop concep-
tual models or theory-like constructs. Some cognitive tests 
of babies, correspondingly, look for abilities to represent 
hidden objects or to distinguish or match different objects 
based on their conceptual meaning, for example in terms of 
category membership. Once the child has passed infancy it 
becomes possible to look at the development of capacities to 
represent the world through language. 
Cognitive abilities also implicate capacities to direct and 
control one’s attention and to regulate one’s thinking and 
behaviour. These capacities for attending to the world, 
storing and encoding experience and representations, 
creating and executing planned actions (means-ends), and 
controlling and inhibiting responses, are often referred to 
as information-processing capacities. It has been argued 
that information-processing capacities may represent the 
most fundamental, purest and best estimate of mental 
ability and that impairments in information processing 
may underlie delays in the development of representational 
capacities (Zelazo & Stack, 1997). This view is supported 
by evidence that estimates of information processing 
capacities in infants appear to be better predictors of future 
IQ than standardised tests of developmental progress (see 
Slater, 1995). In infancy, information processing is most 
often assessed by studying infants’ abilities to control and 
direct their attention to visual stimuli. Approaches include 
the repeated presentation of pairs of interesting stimuli on 
computer or television screens and the recording of infants’ 
spontaneous or novelty preferences. Alternatively, one can 
present infants with a single stimulus and assess the rate at 
which infants become ‘used to’ the stimulus (habituation) 
and the amount of recovery of attention they show when 
presented with a new stimulus (dis-habituation). 
Colombo (2001) has proposed that the development of 
four separate neural substructures underpins the develop-
ment of infants’ attention, with each structure responsible 
for a different aspect of attentional control. These are: 
Alertness or anticipatory readiness for stimuli which is 
modulated by brainstem activities; Spatial Orienting, the 
shifting of attention to and from particular stimuli under 
the control of posterior brain systems; Attention To Object 
Features, systems for analysing the visual properties of 
stimuli that will lead to their identifi cation, determined 
by pathways in the occipital and temporal cortex; and 
Endogenous Attention, volitional capacities for directing, 
holding or inhibiting the direction of attention mediated 
by the frontal lobes. This function being the last to develop 
in typically developing infants. These sub-systems seem to 
represent important components of information processing 
and it is proposed that these may be the basis on which 
cognitive development progresses. 
There is evidence that children with Down syndrome 
differ from typically developing infants in the development 
and deployment of their attentional resources and have 
known neurological impairments. For example, differ-
ences have been found both in utero and in early infancy, 
in the rate of habituation of infants with Down syndrome 
(Hepper & Shaidullah, 1992). Also infants with Down 
syndrome show different patterns of visual preference in 
early infancy (Miranda & Fantz, 1973; Miranda, 1976). 
Correspondingly, when performing information process-
ing tasks, people with Down syndrome show differences in 
the amplitude of cerebral event-related potentials (Karrer, 
Wojtascek & Davis, 1995). These differences in attentional 
performance and in event-related potentials are likely to be 
a consequence of differences in the structure and devel-
opment of the frontal lobes and cortex (i.e. Logdberg 
& Brun, 1993; Takashima, Becker, Armstrong & Chan, 
1981). Karrer, Karrer, Bloom, Chaney and Davis (1998) 
have proposed that children with Down syndrome may 
have particular impairments in ‘frontal’ processing that 
may affect a range of inhibitory processes (correspond-
ing to Colombo’s endogenous attention). However, more 
detailed examinations of component attentional processes 
are required. Focussing on different attentional systems in 
the terms outlined by Colombo (2001), may allow us to 
describe the unique developmental profi le of infants with 
Down syndrome in a more fi ne-grained way. We may be 
able to establish whether specifi c components are impaired 
or spared in infants with Down syndrome or whether 
infants with Down syndrome have a more global infor-
mation-processing defi cit. For example Zelazo and Stack 
(1997) suggest that inhibitory problems may be conse-
quence of slower overall processing and not a product of a 
specifi c impairment in frontal processes.
In our studies we have presented infants with a series 
of static and moving stimuli on computer screens. The 
primary intention was to look at capacities for visual dis-
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crimination between meaningful stimuli, requiring what 
Colombo (2001) refers to as ‘attention to object features’ 
but the tasks also yielded measures relating to other aspects 
of attention. Zelazo and Stack (1997) suggest that sequen-
tial stimuli may be the best visual stimuli to use for assess-
ing attentional capacities. Therefore, of particular interest, 
were infants’ responses during a task involving the repeated 
presentations of animations of circles depicting ‘billiard 
ball’, causal and non-causal collisions (based on Leslie & 
Keeble, 1987). The fi rst test condition was a non-causal 
event and involved one circle appearing from one side of 
the screen and moving towards another circle located in the 
centre. The fi rst circle stopped before reaching the central 
ball. The second circle then moved off and disappeared off 
the other side of the screen (a non-caused action). This 
event was repeated until the infants habituated. A number 
of measures of attention were collected. These were: the 
total duration of looking; the length of longest look; the 
number of looks; the number of complete stimulus events 
seen; the total duration of looking away and the latency of 
orienting to the fi rst presentation of the event. Surprisingly 
the last two measures are not normally reported in habitua-
tion studies but are the most likely to provide useful infor-
mation regarding inhibitory attentional processes in infants 
with Down syndrome (Oates, Moore & Hobson, 1997; 
Moore, Oates, Goodwin & Hobson, 2000). 
Factor analysis of these measures in our cohort of typically 
developing infants and infants with Down syndrome sug-
gested that these measures might indeed be tapping into 
separate attentional processes. The analysis yielded a three-
factor solution. These factors seem to map onto three of 
the components of attention identifi ed by Colombo. Dura-
tion of looking and the length of the longest look loaded 
together and seemed to represent an alertness factor ; the 
number of looks and number of complete stimulus events 
seen loaded together and indicated spatial orienting ; and 
the duration of looking away between looks and the latency 
of orienting to the fi rst presentation of a stimulus seemed 
to be a measure of endogenous attention (Moore et al., 
2000). 
We examined the performance of the infants with Down 
syndrome when 6 months old, and compared their per-
formance to our control group of typically developing 
infants at 4 months of age, when considered comparable 
in general developmental level (see Rauh, Schellhas, Goeg-
gerle & Muller, 1996). Results revealed that the infants 
with Down syndrome, showed signifi cantly lower alertness 
(smaller duration of looking) and endogenous attention 
(slower latency and longer looks away) but were equivalent 
in spatial orienting (Moore et al., 2000). Thus, these com-
ponent measures of attention seem to capture specifi c differ-
ences and not just delays in cognitive functioning between 
children with Down syndrome and typically developing 
children. These differences may not be picked up by more 
traditional cognitive tests, and while differences in alert-
ness may be picked up by traditional habituation measures, 
endogenous attention may only be possible to index during 
habituation by examining patterns of latency and ‘looking 
away’. One particular advantage of this approach is that the 
measurement of attentional process is not so dependent on 
establishing a social rapport with the infant. Thus it may be 
a more profi table way to assess the ‘pure’ cognitive abilities 
of children with Down syndrome independently of social 
competence (Zelazo & Stack, 1997).
While visual attention tasks may prove to be particularly 
useful for testing cognitive functioning in infants, they are 
rarely used for this purpose. Instead developmental tests 
such as Bayley Scales are often used to assess cognitive level 
(Bayley, 1969; 1993). The Bayley scales consist of a number 
of tasks devised to assess the competence of babies at each 
month of development, and to provide an indication of 
whether the babies have achieved a typical developmental 
level. Some tasks may be administered only to younger or 
older infants. The scale includes Piagetian object-search 
and means-ends tasks designed to assess the development 
of representational abilities, as well as tasks assessing fi ne 
motor skills, visual perceptual processing, planning abili-
ties, memory, social abilities and language. By looking at 
performance across the whole range of tasks administered, 
the Bayley scales deliver scores on four developmental 
‘facets’: cognitive, social, language and motor. 
For this project, the central problem with using this scale 
for extracting a ‘pure’ cognitive measure was that all the 
tasks of the Bayley scales, including those that go to make 
up the cognitive facet score, involve a social interaction 
between tester and infant, confounding social with cogni-
tive competence. Some aspects of task performance may be 
determined not only by an infant’s cognitive abilities but 
also by the capacity of child and tester to develop a rap-
port, and thereby to establish scaffolding. There are also 
additional problems for researchers of infants with Down 
syndrome. The tasks intended to be indicators of cognitive 
level also rely on motor manipulation and language to dem-
onstrate competence. In fact, many of the individual tasks 
contribute to scores on the motor, language and cognitive 
facets. This is not a problem when using the scales as a clini-
cal tool to identify the presence of atypical development, as 
the identifi cation of a delay or difference in performance is 
the main objective, not the identifi cation of the source of 
the performance defi cit. However, where there are known 
specifi c language and motor delays, as is often the case for 
children with Down syndrome, these language and motor 
delays may obscure other cognitive competencies and lead 
to an underestimation of ‘pure’ cognitive abilities. 
For this reason, we have made an attempt to extract out 
from the Bayley scales a collection of those tasks where the 
social, motor and language components have a reduced 
infl uence on the expression of cognitive competence. The 
aim has been to create a shorter, relatively pure, cognitive 
scale (Goodwin, Oates & Moore, 2000). With this short-
form, a score of cognitive achievement can be constructed 
by considering the number of tasks passed at each age. This 
short-form can then be used to assess the relationships, 
within-groups, between cognitive and social abilities. 
While still in development, the measure has been useful 
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as a means of establishing the equivalence of our groups of 
infants with and without Down syndrome in their cogni-
tive functioning at each data sweep (Goodwin et al., 2000). 
Using this technique we have been able to confi rm that the 
cognitive level of our infants with Down syndrome when 
6, 12 and 18 months old is equivalent to that of our con-
trol typically developing infants when 4, 7 and 10 months 
old. This supported our initial estimates of likely cognitive 
levels based on Rauh et al. (1996).
In summary, we have established, using a short form of 
the Bayley scales, that it may be possible to measure some 
aspects of cognitive functioning relatively independently of 
social, motor and language capacities. This also established 
more clearly the cognitive equivalence of our cohorts of 
typically developing infants and infants with Down syn-
drome at each data collection point. We have also been 
able, using habituation tasks, to measure important dif-
ferences in attentional capacities between the cohorts that 
may underpin delays in cognitive development. It may, for 
example, prove that these attentional differences underpin 
the different profi les of errors and instability in cognitive 
performance of infants with Down syndrome noted, for 
example, by Morss (1983) and Wishart and Duffy (1990).
Cognitive influences on social 
development 
How do these unique profi les of cognitive delay and differ-
ence infl uence social development in children with Down 
syndrome? In particular, to what extent and by what mech-
anisms do attentional differences infl uence the development 
of social understanding? One argument might be that just 
because infants with Down syndrome have problems with 
attending to the world in general it is not inevitable that 
they will be impaired in attending to people. Indeed, it is 
plausible to argue that some early processes used for inter-
preting people’s faces and extracting social meanings, such 
as their emotions, may use specialised, dedicated, modular 
like, low-level neurological architecture. At least in early 
development, these may operate independently of the neu-
rological systems responsible for general attention detailed 
by Colombo (see Moore, Hobson & Anderson, 1995). It is 
also possible that these systems may be relatively spared in 
people with intellectual defi cits and, because of this, people 
with attentional problems and intellectual defi cits may be 
able, in early infancy, to develop relatively typical social 
relationships. 
Recent evidence partly supports this view, as it seems that 
young children with Down syndrome perform similarly to 
typically developing children matched for mental age on 
emotion recognition tasks (Kasari, Freeman & Hughes, 
2001), and Heimann, Ullstadius and Swerlander (1998) 
report spared imitative abilities. However, there is also 
evidence that older children with Down syndrome perform 
poorly on emotion recognition tasks relative both to mental 
age equivalent typically developing children and to people 
with general learning diffi culties (Wishart & Pitcairn, 
2000). The source of these performance defi cits remains to 
be established. Perhaps they do refl ect a basic impairment in 
emotion recognition. However it may be that primary emo-
tional capacities are intact, and it is the expression of these 
that is constrained by the reduced information-processing 
capacities of the infants with Down syndrome. This differ-
ence may not controlled for by matching on measures such 
as the Bayley scales. If infants with Down syndrome are 
slower or more inconsistent in orienting and responding 
then this may well impair their ability to perform emotion 
recognition tasks (Moore, 2001) and affect their responses 
to people in social interactions. Even if basic sensitivities 
to emotional patterning are preserved, the differential 
responses of infants with Down syndrome may create a dif-
ferent quality of social interaction that will lead to different 
developmental outcomes (Richard, 1986).
In order to develop a fuller picture of the development of 
infants with Down syndrome we need to explore these 
transactional processes across time. Specifi cally we need 
to assess: infants’ constituent attentional capacities in 
non-social situations; infants’ attention and behaviour 
within social interactions; the effect of their behaviour 
on caregivers; and the processes by which different forms 
of mother-infant interaction, in turn, infl uence the social 
and cognitive development of the child. As outlined above, 
there is already evidence that infants with Down syndrome 
demonstrate attentional problems in non-social situations. 
There is also some evidence that infants show different 
attentional profi les in social interactions.
For example, in a longitudinal study of fi ve infants with 
Down syndrome and a control group of typically develop-
ing infants from 1 to 6 months, Berger and Cunningham 
(1981) reported that during a face-to-face interaction with 
their mother typically developing infants showed the great-
est levels of eye-contact between 2 and 4 months of age. 
After four months of age this level of eye contact then falls 
off. In contrast, infants with Down syndrome showed a 
delayed but steady increase in percentage eye-contact over 
the course of the fi rst six months reaching the levels of 
4-month-old typically developing infants by around six 
months of age. Infants with Down syndrome did not then 
show a fall off in looking and seem to maintain higher 
levels of looking to their mothers. Also, their looking was 
characterised by shorter lengths of individual eye-contact 
episodes.
While infants with Down syndrome seem to differ in the 
time they spend looking to the mother, both typically 
developing infants and infants with Down syndrome show 
a similar reduction in eye contact when their mother ceases 
interacting with them during a ‘still-face’ period. This sug-
gests that the infants in each group have similar emotional 
reactions to the unresponsive behaviour of the mother. 
Berger and Cunningham (1986) also reported that infants 
with Down syndrome showed reduced smiling during 
face-to-face interactions. Similar fi ndings were reported by 
Legerstee and Bowman (1989) and by Crown, Feldstein, 
Jasnow, Beebe and Jaffe (1992).
47
Down Syndrome Research and Practice 8(2), 43-52
© 2002 The Down Syndrome Educational Trust. All Rights Reserved. ISSN: 0968-7912
http://www.down-syndrome.net/library/periodicals/dsrp/08/02/
D.G. Moore, J.M.Oates,  R.P. Hobson & J. Goodwin • Cognitive and social factors
Similarly despite delays in the achievement of levels of 
eye-contact, and shorter individual eye-contact episodes in 
face-to-face interactions, Gunn, Berry and Andrews (1982) 
reported that 6- to 9-month-old infants with Down syn-
drome spent more total time during play looking at their 
mother than at objects. This looking was nearly twice that 
of typically developing infants of the same chronological 
age. Landry and Chapieski (1990) studied 6-month-old 
infants with Down syndrome and found that infants with 
Down syndrome looked more to the mother and less at a 
toy even compared to pre-term infants matched for mental 
age. This also occurred even when the mothers were not 
actively involved in play. Thus, early in development, 
infants with Down syndrome may be exhibiting less eye 
contact but actually looking for longer amounts of time 
at their mothers than chronological age- and mental age-
comparable control infants.
How does the behaviour of the infants with Down syn-
drome infl uence maternal behaviour? Is there any evidence 
that the behaviour of mothers of infants with Down 
syndrome is different from that of mothers of typically 
developing infants? Hyche, Bakeman and Adamson (1992) 
reported that mothers who had brought up children with 
Down syndrome were more sensitive to the communica-
tive cues captured on videotape of children with Down 
syndrome than mothers of typically developing infants. 
However, mothers of infants with Down syndrome, despite 
being more sensitive to the cues of infants with Down syn-
drome, still found infants with Down syndrome of around 
7 months of age more diffi cult to ‘read’ than typically 
developing infants of the same age. How would this infl u-
ence their behaviour? Buckhalt, Rutherford and Goldberg 
(1978) reported that their sample of babies with Down 
syndrome, ranging in age from 9 to 18 months, smiled 
and vocalised less and that, correspondingly, the mothers 
of infants with Down syndrome spoke to their infants at a 
signifi cantly faster rate than mothers of typically develop-
ing infants. This suggests that the form of mother-infant 
interaction for Down syndrome dyads may come to differ in 
some important respects to that of typical dyads.
Thus there is evidence that infants with Down syndrome 
differ in their attentional capacities and propensities and 
this is evident in their behaviour in both social and non-
social situations. There is also some evidence that maternal 
behaviour may differ as a consequence of these differences 
in attentional capacities. However, there have been no stud-
ies that have concurrently measured social and non-social 
attentional factors and established their role in infl uenc-
ing maternal interactional style. This is necessary if one is 
attempting to develop a transactional model of the develop-
ment of infants with Down syndrome.
In our study, we examined mother-infant interactions 
during early infancy (at 4 months for typically developing 
children and 6 months for children with Down syndrome). 
We used the still-face paradigm of Tronick, Als, Adamson, 
Wise and Brazelton (1978) to assess the quality of early 
mother-infant interactions. In the fi rst phase of the proce-
dure mother and infants engaged in face-to-face interaction 
for three minutes. In the second phase the mother was 
asked, when a signal was given, to display a passive face 
and not to respond to the infant for up to 90 seconds, but 
less if the infant became distressed. In the fi nal phase the 
mother and infant re-engaged in their normal interaction 
for 3 minutes. 
We found that our sample of infants with Down syndrome 
responded similarly to typically developing infants. The 
groups showed the same percentage amount of looking 
and smiling to the mother during the fi rst and fi nal phases, 
and a similar decrement in looking and smiling when a still 
face was displayed. They did differ however in the amount 
of fussing, with infants with Down syndrome showing less 
fussing during the still face event than typically developing 
infants (Oates, Moore, Goodwin, Hobson & Reynolds, 
2002). These fi ndings do not concur with those of Berger 
and Cunningham (1981) and this may be due to different 
methods, but an additional important fi nding emerged 
from this task that may also help explain these contrary 
fi ndings. 
While, in general, the infants with Down syndrome did 
not appear to behave differently to typically developing 
infants, the mothers did. We found that the mothers of 
infants with Down syndrome in our sample differed from 
typically developing mothers in their behaviour during the 
interaction phases when rated on the mother-infant inter-
action scales devised by Murray, Fiori-Cowley, Hooper 
and Cooper (1996). Using Principal Component Analysis 
we found that these 14 scales reduce to three meaningful 
factors. We found that the mothers of infants with Down 
syndrome signifi cantly differed from the mothers of typi-
cally developing infants on two of these factors. Mothers 
of children with Down syndrome scored signifi cantly 
higher than the mothers of typically developing infants 
on the factor comprised of ratings of ‘effort to engage’, 
‘warmth’, ‘happiness’, ‘absorption in their infant’, etc. - the 
factor we have labelled ‘warmth’. However, alongside this 
positive interaction quality the mothers also differed on the 
factor we have labelled ‘forcefulness’ derived from ratings of 
‘intrusiveness’, ‘sensitivity’, and ‘responsivity’, with moth-
ers of Down syndrome being rated as less sensitive, less 
responsive and more intrusive (Oates, Moore, Goodwin, 
Hobson, & Reynolds, 1998; Oates, et al., 2002).
We have come to call this combined style of interaction 
‘forceful warmth’, and have found that the degree to which 
the mothers of infants with Down syndrome demonstrated 
‘forceful warmth’ was strongly associated with the infants’ 
endogenous attention measured on the non-social visual 
attention task described earlier. We hypothesise that the 
reason the infants with Down syndrome in our cohort 
showed similar levels to the typically developing infants in 
attention and smiling during the face-to-face interaction (in 
contrast to the fi ndings of Berger & Cunningham, 1981, 
1986) is that the mothers were working to increase their 
infants’ responsivity to them by showing greater warmth. 
While this style may be positive in terms of engaging the 
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infants, the mothers may also demonstrate a correspond-
ing reduction in their sensitivity to their infants within the 
interaction. Their concentration on giving warm and posi-
tive feedback may make them more ‘forceful’ and less likely 
to pick up on the social bids of their infants.
While it is important to seek further support for this fi nd-
ing by examining interactions in more naturalistic settings 
and with larger samples, it seems that constraints in the 
attentional capacities of infants with Down syndrome may 
create a form of early social interaction in which the mother 
plays a central role in maintaining and redirecting infant 
attention (Landry & Chapieski, 1989). What might be the 
implications of this early form of interaction for the later 
development of infants with Down syndrome?
Social influences on cognitive 
development
One possibility is that the form of interaction where the 
infant is dependent on the mother for engaging its atten-
tion within a dyadic social interaction may tend to ‘lock 
in’ the infant and make them less likely to spontaneously 
attend to objects beyond this dyad. This is supported by 
the fi ndings of Landry and Chapieski (1990), who reported 
that 6-month-old children with Down syndrome tended to 
look more to their mother than an object during play. If 
this continues then there is a possibility that infants with 
Down syndrome will not engage in typical ‘triadic’, joint 
attention interactions involving mother, infant and objects 
with implications for later cognitive development. Triadic 
interactions emerge in typical infants around the end of 
the fi rst year, and may be critical for the development of 
language, fl exible thought and meta-cognitive awareness 
(Hobson, 2002). Even at six months atypical interactions 
may already have repercussions for language development 
(see Berger & Cunningham, 1983). But what evidence 
is there that these ‘forceful’ interaction styles continue 
beyond early infancy, and does this affect the quality of tri-
adic interactions between mothers and infants with Down 
syndrome? Furthermore, is there any evidence that this 
then impacts of the development of language and fl exible 
thinking? 
Cielinski, Vaughn, Seifer and Contreras (1995) studied 
children with Down syndrome of 17 to 44 months during 
play episodes. They measured infant engagement with toys 
during individual and social play and examined the quality 
of mother-infant interaction during the social play episodes. 
They found no signifi cant group differences in comparison 
to typically developing children of similar developmental 
levels in the proportion of time infants with Down syn-
drome engaged with toys during individual play. However, 
they found signifi cant differences in the proportion of time 
the infants spent engaging with toys in social play, with the 
children with Down syndrome spending less time engaged 
with toys than the typically developing children. Further-
more the children with Down syndrome spent a greater 
proportion of time engaging with the mother in face-to-
face interaction without toys. 
Cielinski et al (1995) also reported that the quality of the 
mother-infant interactions during the social play episodes 
differed, with mothers of boys and girls with Down syn-
drome rated as more ‘intrusive’ and mothers of girls with 
Down syndrome rated as more ‘directive’ than mothers of 
typically developing girls. It was also found that maternal 
directiveness was positively correlated with the propor-
tion of time the children engaged with toys for the group 
of children with Down syndrome but not for typically 
developing children. The infants with Down syndrome of 
more directive mothers spending more time playing with 
the toys. Thus, the mothers of 17-month-old infants with 
Down syndrome are demonstrating qualitatively different 
maternal behaviour in responses to their infants, compared 
to mothers of typically developing infants, with the moth-
ers of infants with Down syndrome playing a more pivotal 
role in directing their infants’ attention. 
Ruskin, Kasari, Mundy and Sigman (1994) studied the 
attention of 22-month-old children with Down syndrome 
during presentations of social (a person singing) and 
non-social (a toy) stimuli. They reported that children 
with Down syndrome looked for signifi cantly longer at 
the person and were more likely to engage in singing 
than mental age-equivalent typically developing infants. 
While there were no differences in attention to the toy, 
the infants with Down syndrome were more likely to 
push it away. Importantly, while this might suggest that 
the children with Down syndrome have relatively typical 
social responses with a stranger and a toy, it is important 
to note that the children with Down syndrome engaged 
in signifi cantly less off-task looks to their mothers during 
this interaction, again suggesting a different quality to their 
joint attention with mothers. Kasari, Freeman, Mundy and 
Sigman (1995) also reported that compared to typically 
developing controls, children with Down syndrome tend 
to show fewer social referencing looks to their mother in an 
ambiguous situation, although their responses to initiated 
joint attention did not differ.
These results show that there is a complex relationship 
between an infant’s attentional capacities and maternal 
behaviour, and that by the middle of the second year 
this may have evolved into a form of interaction in which 
mothers of children with Down syndrome act as impor-
tant mediators of the infant’s attention. Mothers may be 
compensating for constraints in capacities for endogenous 
attentional control by becoming more directive but also 
correspondingly less sensitive to the infants’ bids. The 
fi ndings of Ruskin et al. (1994) suggest that a possible cost 
of this compensatory strategy may be in the infants’ subse-
quent inability to regulate their own behaviour in associ-
ated joint attention episodes and to spontaneously perform 
social referencing.
Thus, we may have an example of an earlier social factor, 
the nature of early mother-infant interaction, acting on 
the later development of spontaneous joint attention. What 
impact does this then have on cognitive development? 
While Mundy, Sigman, Kasari and Yirmiya (1988) reported 
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relative strengths in social-interaction in 18-48 month old 
children with Down syndrome compared to mental age 
equivalent typically developing children, they also found 
a relative defi cit in the tendency for children with Down 
syndrome to make requests for objects or for assistance 
with objects. Individual differences in requesting in their 
sample were also signifi cantly associated with measures of 
expressive language. Indeed there seems to be an overall 
tendency for infants with Down syndrome to make fewer 
spontaneous social-communicative signals (Fischer, 1987). 
Further support for an association between early social-
communicative capacities and language development in 
this population comes from a longitudinal study by Mundy, 
Kasari, Sigman and Ruskin (1995) which looked at chil-
dren with Down syndrome when 22 and then 35 months. 
They found signifi cant group differences in comparison 
to mental age equivalent typically developing controls in 
requesting and in responding to joint attention initiations 
from others. Also they found that individual differences in 
requesting and in initiating joint attention at 22 months 
predicted expressive language in the children with Down 
syndrome when 35 months old. Requesting also predicted 
expressive language capacities in the typically developing 
children but tendency to initiate joint attention did not. 
Mundy et al. (1995) proposed that defi cits in requesting 
behaviour might explain expressive language defi cits in 
children with Down syndrome and proposed that these 
requesting defi cits may represent a primary defi cit and are 
not a consequence of differences in affective processes or 
caregiver responsivity and directiveness. 
However specifi c requesting defi cits have not been found 
in other studies (more on this later) and, in contrast, 
Harris, Kasari and Sigman (1996) have reported strong 
associations between joint attention capacities and the 
development of receptive language in children with Down 
syndrome. While a relative strength compared to expres-
sive language, the development of receptive language in 
children with Down syndrome was also found to be related 
to capacities for non-verbal communication. Harris et al. 
(1996) reported that children with Down syndrome, once 
engaged in joint attention will spend longer attending to 
caregiver selected foci of attention and that caregivers of 
infants with Down syndrome are more in control of the 
topic of attention. Critically, the best predictor of recep-
tive language was not infant’s attention to mothers’ topics. 
Rather, receptive language was related to mothers’ sensitiv-
ity to their infants’ attention: mothers who more frequently 
redirected their attention away from the topic selected by 
the infant had infants who were less able in terms of recep-
tive language.
Thus, children’s attentional defi cits may have a determin-
ing infl uence on the nature of mother-infant interaction 
which in turn may infl uence the development of expressive 
and receptive language. In our study, we were interested 
in exploring these issues taking a longitudinal perspective. 
We wished to establish, whether, as reported by Franco and 
Wishart (1995), there were differences between mental 
age equivalent groups of typically developing and Down 
syndrome infants (at 10 and 18 months), in triadic com-
municative acts critical for language development such as 
joint attention, social referencing and requesting. We also 
wanted to establish whether the quality of early mother-
infant interaction evidenced at 6-months-of-age in infants 
with Down syndrome predict these differences. While the 
studies above provide evidence for a relationship between 
the quality of mother infant interaction and triadic com-
municative acts, they do help to determine the transac-
tional nature and origins of this association.
In our sample we found that when the infants with Down 
syndrome were 18 months of age, relative to typically devel-
oping infants tested at 10 months of age, there were no 
specifi c defi cits in requesting behaviour. Indeed we found 
some evidence for relatively spared requesting in our sample 
(Moore et al, 2000). In addition we did not fi nd group 
differences in responses to joint attention when initiated by 
the tester. These fi ndings contrast with those of Mundy et 
al. (1995) but mirror those of Sigman and Ruskin (1999) 
who, with a larger sample, reported no defi cits in the 
initiation of requesting behaviours compared to children 
with other developmental delays of equivalent mental age. 
However, they found that the frequency of requesting and 
frequency of responding to joint attention was signifi cantly 
less than that of mental age equivalent typically developing 
children. They also reported that measures of initiation and 
responses to joint attention were associated with measures 
of verbal abilities.
The reasons for the different levels of responses to joint 
attention in the two studies requires further exploration 
and may be explained in terms of matching procedures. 
However, although the levels of responding may have been 
higher for our sample, it is perhaps of more relevance that 
we found that within-group variation in responses to adult 
prompts to joint attention at 18-months were strongly 
associated with the quality of mother-infant interaction 
(maternal ‘forceful warmth’) when 6-months-old. More 
specifi cally, those mothers who displayed ‘forceful warmth’ 
had infants who were less responsive to the tester’s prompts 
for joint attention (pointing and looking at objects). This 
suggests that their attention is more mediated through their 
mother and not easily modulated by others. Interestingly 
this correlation also held for typically developing infants 
from 4 to 10 months. However, while maternal ‘forceful 
warmth’ was predicted by the infant’s attention during the 
non-social visual attention task for the infants with Down 
syndrome, this was not so for typically developing infants. 
While similar developmental processes may be unfolding, 
individual differences in ‘forceful warmth’ of the mothers 
of typically developing infants may be due to factors other 
than their infants’ attentional capacities.
Conclusions
Our fi ndings, and those of other researchers in the fi eld, 
support a transactional account of the development of 
infants with Down syndrome. We have proposed develop-
mental process that lead to children with Down syndrome 
50
Down Syndrome Research and Practice 8(2), 43-52
© 2002 The Down Syndrome Educational Trust. All Rights Reserved. ISSN: 0968-7912
http://www.down-syndrome.net/library/periodicals/dsrp/08/02/
D.G. Moore, J.M.Oates,  R.P. Hobson & J. Goodwin • Cognitive and social factors
developing different patterns of triadic relations as mani-
fest in social-communicative acts. While further work is 
needed to establish which social-communicative acts are 
most affected by the factors we have studied (i.e. request-
ing and/or joint attention) we can now provide a general 
developmental account that may underlie these defi cits. A 
transactional model is presented in Figure 1.
We propose that neurologically-based differences in early 
attention regulation in children with Down syndrome 
may make them slower to respond and orient in social 
interactions. This then elicits a warmer but more forceful 
maternal style during interactions that serves to maintain 
typical levels of attention in infants with Down syndrome. 
This different social style may make infants with Down 
syndrome more focussed on the mother and may serve 
an important and useful function in developing early 
emotional attachments (Berry, Gunn & Andrews, 1980). 
However, this may also make infants more ‘locked in’ and 
dependent on their mothers for regulating their attention. 
Subsequently, aspects of ‘triadic’ engagement and joint 
attention are more likely to be driven by the mother. Thus, 
when less frequent but critically important ‘topic’ bids are 
made by infants with Down syndrome, they may not be 
picked up because mothers are continuing to work hard 
to direct and maintain attention using this ‘forceful’ and 
‘warm’ affective style. Ultimately, the characteristic quality 
of these triadic interactions may add to delays in language 
development and in the development of fl exible symbolic 
thought (Hobson, 2002).
The results of our studies support an account of the devel-
opment of children with Down syndrome that goes beyond 
simple deterministic or environmental explanations. We also 
offer an account that explains the development of infants 
with Down syndrome within the same parameters as those 
used to explain typical development. Of course, to confi rm 
our hypotheses further longitudinal studies are needed, 
starting in early infancy and utilising additional measures 
and larger samples. If these studies confi rm our fi ndings, 
then it may be possible to provide useful suggestions for 
early interventions with infants with Down syndrome and 
their mothers, interventions that would hold promise for 
facilitating both social and cognitive development.
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